Public oversight of the law is an important subject for Economics, with a special link to Ethics. IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) Fishing is one of the most obnoxious problems that persecute the development of the fisheries sector, worldwide. The political, economic, social and environmental issues involved with “crime and punishment” problematic are absolutely relevant. Currently, the European Union is taking an “on-going” reform of the so-called Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). One of the fundamental points in discussion refers to the Monitoring and Control system. This article explores these issues. The analysis combines the fundaments of the basic bio-economic model of fisheries with Becker's theory of “Crime and Punishment” and it is applied to the CFP case.

ethics; law; enforcement; illegal behavior; compliance; common fisheries policy; green development

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