Driving factors behind farmers’ preferences for choosing Xinfang system as land dispute settlement body
Vol 8, Issue 3, 2024
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Abstract
This study offers a focused examination on Xinfang system, China’s unique mechanism particularly on its ability and efficacy in mediating land disputes between farmers and governmental bodies for social governance purposes. Based on interviews with 10 farmers, the study elucidates the system has low entry barriers and user-friendly, thus fast becoming the preferred system option when dealing with land conflicts. Xinfang facilitates direct communication between farmers and government officials, thereby in line with the sociocultural conventions of the rural populace. The study also highlights several constraints. While the Xinfang system employs a multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, including negotiation and grassroots governmental intervention, it lacks legislative power and institutional authority that are required for effective management of more complex or multi-stakeholder land disputes. The study advocates for a comprehensive reassessment and subsequent reform of the Xinfang system, focusing particularly on its mechanisms and procedures for dispute resolution. Such reforms are not merely instrumental for the more robust safeguarding of farmers’ land rights, but also for enhancing the overall integrity and public trust in China’s legal and administrative frameworks.
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i3.2944
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