The conceptual blending of Laozi’s Dao and its companions with Heidegger’s triad existences

Zhimin Liu, Lu Liu

Article ID: 7225
Vol 8, Issue 9, 2024

VIEWS - 31 (Abstract) 2 (PDF)

Abstract


Laozi’s Ming (name), Qi (tangible part) and Dao (intangible part), coexisting in the same substance, can be compared with Heidegger’s triad existences: Seiende (being), Dasein (beings) and Sein (to be). In Laozi, Dao is the essential metonymy for the existence of things from Wu (void, nothing) to You (there is, reality). The effect of Dao is De (virtue) and the combined term of them is Dao-De (morality). By conceptual blend theory, we may draw the following conclusion from the perspective of Heidegger’s ontology of triad existences and Laozi’s Dao with its companions: any being (Seiende or Ming) exists in the form of combination beings (Dasein or Qi) and to be (Sein or Dao). According to Proper Parts Principle, if z, x, y is used to represent being, beings and to be respectively, then, the expression of all things will be the form: z∃ (x) ⊕ y. In terms of independent concept and function, Dao exists as whole. While from Laozi’s triangular relationship among Ming, Dao and Qi, Dao can be considered as a proper parthood, too. Both Laozi and Heidegger emphasized that existence is changing, but Heidegger attributed the reason for change to time, while Laozi to Dao. Dao can be considered as way, essence, nothingness, empty, void etc. in structure, but it doesn’t mean it’s zero or none-existing. On the contrary, it is a form of existence from exotic domain. Both the numeric expression of Heidegger’s triad existences and Laozi’s triangle existences of Dao with its companions can be written as "z∃x (1) ⊕ y(Ø) Û z{1, Ø}. In which, Ø is empty set as Laozi’s Dao or Heidegger’s Sein (Ø Û 0).


Keywords


Dao; companions; Heidegger’s triad existences; conceptual blend theory

Full Text:

PDF


References


Ackerman, D. (1979). Proper names, essences and intuitive beliefs. Theory and Decision, 11(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126689

Al-Sharafi, A. G. M. (2004). Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory. In: Textual Metonymy. Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938909

Banka, R. (2023). Dao as a Unified Composition or Plurality: A Nihilism Perspective. Dao, 22(3), 381–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-023-09891-x

Bartolini, E. (2019). Systemics of Incompleteness and Quasi-Systems. In: Contemporary Systems Thinking. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15277-2

Berto, F. (2013). To Exist and to Count. In: Existence as a Real Property. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4207-9_2.

D’Ambrosio, P. (2020). HE Yan’s “Essay on Dao” and “Essay on the Nameless”. Dao Companion to Xuanxue 玄學 (Neo-Daoism). In: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy. Springer, Cham. 14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49228-1_9

David, C. (2014). Nothingness and the Clearing: Heidegger, Daoism and the Quest for Primal Clarity. The Review of Metaphysics, 67(3), 583–601.

Drake, J. (2002). The academic brand of aphasia: Where postmodernism and the science wars came from. Knowledge, Technology and Policy, 15(1–2), 13–187. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12130-002-1024-y

Fu, C. W. H. (1976). Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 3(2), 115–143. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.1976.tb00384.x

Gandolfo, S. (2019). Metaphors of Metaphors: Reflections on the Use of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in Premodern Chinese Texts. Dao, 18(3), 323–345. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-019-09669-0

Geaney, J. (2020). What Is Ming 名? “Name” Not “Word”. Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. In: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7

Heidegger. (2005) Being and Time. In: Philosophy’s Higher Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020- 2348-0_3.

Heidegger, M. (1982). Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism. Capuzzi, Harper and Row.

Hon, T. K. (2020). The Ontology of Change: WANG Bi’s Interpretation of the Yijing. In: Chai, D. (editor). Dao Companion to Xuanxue 玄學 (Neo-Daoism), Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49228-1_14.

Hudac, M. C. (1990). The ontological difference and the pre-metaphysical status of the being of beings in Plato. Man and World, 23(2), 191–203. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01248723

Jones, N. (2023). Soteriological Mereology in the Pāli Discourses, Buddhaghosa, and Huayan Buddhism. Dao, 22(1), 117–143. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-022-09869-1

Levin, S. B. (2017). Why Organ Conscription Should Be off the Table: Extrapolation from Heidegger’s Being and Time. Sophia, 58(2), 153–174. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0589-6

Liu, X., He, X., Wong, Y. (2015). Daoism from Philosophy to Religion. In: Liu, X. (editor). Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy, Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy. Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2927-0

Martin H. (1969). Identity and Difference. New York: Harper & Row.

Miron, R. (2023). The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. In: Hedwig Conrad-Martius: Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25416-1_4

Nelson, E. S. (2019). Heidegger’s Daoist Turn. Research in Phenomenology, 49(3), 362–384. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341431

Nelson, E. S. (2023). Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom. Bloomsbury. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350411937

Oh, S. (2017). A Re-examination of the Paradox of the Dao. Dao, 16(4), 483–501. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-017-9573-7

Richardson, W. J. (1963). Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In: Heidegger. Phaenomenologica. Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6188-8

Schuler, J., Murray, P., & Yuan, J. (2021). Transcendence vs. lacking transcendence: a dialogue on God, form, picture, Dao, and myriad things. International Communication of Chinese Culture, 8, 153–171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-021-00219-z

Segal, A. (2014). Causal essentialism and mereological monism. Philosophy Study, 169, 227–255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098- 013-0180-0

Shang, G. (2002). Embracing differences and many: The signification of one in Zhuangzi’s utterance of Dao. Dao, 1(2), 229–250. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02857097

Thatcher, M. (2023). Heidegger’s Answer to Plato’s Parmenides. Sophia, 63(2), 345–361. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00983-y

Watson, B. (1968). The Complete Works of Cbuang T-U. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wei, Z. (2005). On the way to a “common” language? Heidegger’s dialogue with a Japanese visitor. Dao, 4(2), 283–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02856730




DOI: https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i9.7225

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Copyright (c) 2024 Zhimin Liu, Lu Liu

License URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This site is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.