New Institutional Economics (NIE) uses solutions from law, economics and organization. The purpose of this article is to link in a single analytical approach the institutional environment, its change in the organizations uniting in one, what is happening in contracts with agricultural lands. The explanation of this type of governance means to integrate: theoretical definitions; formal rules (laws, court decisions and other legal acts); economic institutions—means and mechanisms of exchange; legal and economic forms in which, through governance of transactions property rights are transferred and protected. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to present the elements of the institutional matrix that are the cause of changes in subordination and coordination. Following the process of implementing an approach for reconciling the legal and economic nature of the contract forms and integrating the states, contract organizations and transaction costs in a common model. In order to solve the research problems tasks are adapted methods from law, economics, statistics. Such are: (a) positive legal analysis of legislation; (b) historical (retrospective) method of analysis of changes; (c) discrete-structural analysis to explain the process; (d) comparative-institutional analysis to clarify alternatives and an explanation of any of the effects; (е) regression analysis to model the relationships and present possible one’s scenarios to show the direction in which changes are needed. Changes in legislation, legal forms, mechanisms and the amount of payments create new behavioral patterns that change the contract. Therefore, in retrospect, we are witnessing how the number of changes in legal acts, the amount of fees; the number of participants-administrators of the processes; the number and registers - change the number of transactions; the duration of the actions in the contracts, which ultimately predetermines the different amounts of transaction costs for agricultural lands. This interdependence was established by constructing an econometric model. The analysis presents opportunities for change that would lead to scenarios with a reduced level of transaction costs, that is, improving governance and showing the way to improve the institutional environment related to agricultural lands in Bulgaria.

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