Research on control allocation, legality and acquisition performance of cross-border M&A based on stakeholder theory

Abstract

As the involvement of Chinese enterprises in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) increases, on the one hand, it can drive enterprises to integrate with the international community and accelerate their transformation and upgrading, continuously enhancing their international competitiveness; on the other hand, it will also cause enterprises to experience more setbacks and challenges, especially the “weak acquisition of the strong” reverse cross-border acquisitions, which makes enterprises face a higher risk of failure. Reasonable control rights allocation can fully utilize the competitive advantages of enterprises, achieve synergistic cooperation among shareholders, board of directors, and management, promote the realization of enterprises’ cross-border acquisition goals, and thus enhance the value creation of acquisitions. There is a positive correlation between internal legitimacy and acquisition performance; the relevant assumptions about the distribution of shareholder control rights are invalid; the control rights at the board of directors level are negatively correlated with internal legitimacy and acquisition performance, and internal legitimacy has a mediating effect between the control rights at the board of directors level and acquisition performance, but the moderating effect of the acquisition mode is not significant; the control rights at the management level are negatively correlated with internal legitimacy and acquisition performance, and internal legitimacy has a mediating effect between the control rights at the management level and acquisition performance, and the acquisition mode negatively moderates the relationship between the control rights at the management level and internal legitimacy. This study takes the post-acquisition control rights allocation as the entry point, and examines the cross-border acquisition activities of Chinese enterprises from the perspective of stakeholders. The research results not only can enrich existing acquisition theory, but also can provide theoretical guidance for Chinese enterprise managers on allocation of control of target enterprises, and provide a theoretical basis for the state to formulate and optimize the system and policies of enterprises’ cross-border acquisitions.