Infrastructure policy: Basic design options

Michael Klein

Abstract


The paper lays out basic design options for infrastructure policy. It first sketches mechanisms to assess demand. Then it sets out a hierarchy of issues starting with choice of market structure followed by conduct regulation. Ownership options are largely a function of market structure
choices. The implications for finance—the topic of much day-to-day discussion in infrastructure policy-making—follow from these various prior choices. The discussion naturally circumscribes the role for the so-called public-private partnerships, their uses and pitfalls.


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v1i2.77

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